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Abstract
Does reading sensationalized false news stories make people more violent and dis-
criminatory? Research on false news has focused more on its diffusion and less
on its effects. This study tested the effects of sensationalization, outgroup cues,
and public opinion perception on support for violence and anti-Muslim policies.
We used an online survey experiment with a realistic, interactive website treat-
ment detailing a homicide story in small-town America, written in the style of a
false news article. We found that sensationalist language increased individuals’
support for violence by provoking feelings of anger and fear, while identifying
the suspect in the homicide as a Muslim refugee, versus specifying no outgroup
affiliation, increased support for anti-Muslim policies. Lastly, perceived public
support for violence increased the likelihood of upvoting or writing violent com-
ments. This study contributes to our understanding of the ill effects of false news
and the public debate on online content moderation.
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1 Introduction
Social media companies have identified false news as a significant threat to the integrity
of their online communities across the globe (Hern 2018; Lyons 2018). Media coverage has
frequently linked the dissemination of false news stories—particularly those detailing sensa-
tionalized accounts of criminality or moral wrongdoing—to politically-motivated attempts
to mobilize violence against vulnerable minority groups. In India, the largest market for
Facebook’s WhatsApp platform, political parties have used WhatsApp to spread false sto-
ries of murder and religious sacrilege by Muslims to inflame Muslim-Hindu tensions (Parth
and Bengali 2018). A recent United Nations report claimed that the military in Myanmar
had disseminated false news on Facebook that may have driven genocidal violence against
the Rohingya (Mozur 2018). Non-state actors similarly use false news toward violent ends.
The Sri Lankan government blocked Facebook after witnessing an increase in mob violence
in response to fake, sensationalized content about the alleged misdeeds of Muslims spread
by extremist groups (Goel, Kumar and Frenkel 2018). In the US, the proliferation of anti-
immigrant false news from the alt-right has coincided with a dramatic rise in the number of
reported hate crimes, as recorded by the FBI and the Southern Poverty Law Center (Bar-
rett 2018). While systematic data on the intent of American alt-right content creators are
unavailable, there is anecdotal evidence that some of these producers intentionally seek to
promote or normalize violence. Notably, a leaked “style manual” from the neo-Nazi website
The Daily Stormer instructed its writers that: “It’s illegal to promote violence on the Inter-
net. At the same time, its totally important to normalize the acceptance of violence as an
eventuality/inevitability” (Feinberg 2017).
Do these kinds of false news stories featuring sensationalized claims of wrongdoings by
targeted minority groups affect mass attitudes toward the acceptability of violence and
anti-minority policies? Despite growing concerns over the global proliferation of false news
through social media, we know more about its patterns of diffusion than its effects (Brady
et al. 2017; Lazer et al. 2018; Vosoughi, Roy and Aral 2018); and we know nearly nothing
about its effects on violent attitudes and behavior. Social media provides strong economic
incentives to produce and spread sensationalized, outrage-inducing content (Crockett 2017),
yet we do not know if fabricated news content increases the acceptability of violence, nor
do we understand the cognitive mechanisms by which such an effect would occur. Research
on related phenomena of hate speech and propaganda provide scant guidance: research has
focused mainly on the legal and ethical dimensions of hate speech moderation and less on its
real-world effects (Gates Jr et al. 1996; Waldron 2012), and observational research on geno-
cidal propaganda has produced mixed results (Fujii 2004; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond
2008; Straus 2007; Yanagizawa-Drott 2014). While psychologists have found links between
the consumption of violent media and aggressive behavior, this research has been restricted
to children (Anderson and Sobel 2003; Drabman and Thomas 1974; Huesmann and Miller
1994).
Our study examines the effects of sensationalization, outgroup cues, and public opinion
perception on support for violence and anti-Muslim policies. We used an online 23 factorial
experiment with a realistic, interactive website treatment detailing a homicide story in small-
town America, written in the style of a false news article. Through an analysis of survey, text,
and online behavioral data, we find that sensational content—text, visual memes, and videos
that employ moral-emotional language to present claims of moral violation or wrongdoing—
increases individuals’ endorsement of violence by provoking anger and fear. In addition,
we find that identifying the suspect in the homicide as a Muslim refugee, versus specifying
no outgroup affiliation, increased support for anti-Muslim policies, while perceived public
support for violence increased the likelihood of upvoting or writing violent comments.
This argument builds on research in social psychology that suggests that exposure to
moral violations lowers an individual’s threshold for using violence against perceived norm
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violators by provoking outrage and providing justifications for their punishment (Baumeister
1999; Beck 1999; Crockett 2017; Fiske and Rai 2014; Goldberg, Lerner and Tetlock 1999)
and explores the mechanisms by which political and non-state actors can mobilize a critical
mass of support for violence among the public. The rest of this article proceeds as follows.
The next section briefly reviews the literature on political violence, political mobilization,
and emotion. We then detail our experimental design and variable measurement strategies
and present our results. The final section concludes with a discussion of how these findings
apply to the false news phenomenon and violent political mobilization more generally.
2 Literature Review
The scholarship on collective violence, genocide, and war has long noted the outsized
role of fabricated, sensational content in promoting violence against a targeted outgroup
(Charny 2019; Cohn 1967; Dower 1986; Fein 1979; Herf 2006; Hill 1995; Goldhagen and
Wohlgelernter 1997; Goldhagen 2009; Tsesis 2002). For example, the circulation of Cotton
Mather’s Memorable Providences detailing “real” accounts of bewitchings of innocent chil-
dren is thought to have fueled the persecution of witches in the Massachusetts Bay Colony
(Hill 1995); the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which described a plan for Jewish world
domination, was an important precursor to anti-Semitic Nazi mobilization (Cohn 1967; Herf
2006); and sensationalized accounts of Japanese atrocities against American POWs featured
heavily in American anti-Japanese propaganda designed to recruit soldiers and bolster their
fighting spirit (Dower 1986).
Few scholars, however, have directly tested the causal effects of content on violent at-
titudes, and the results of these studies have been mixed. Looking at political attitudes,
Kalmoe (2014) finds that violent rhetoric interacts with trait aggression to increase support
for political violence. In the context of genocidal violence, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond
(2008) find that the use of dehumanizing racial epithets during attacks on black African pop-
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ulations in Darfur correlated with more extreme violence. Other scholars have challenged
the causal link between hateful content and violence. Looking at the Rwandan genocide,
Straus (2007) argues that the spatial coverage of Hutu-controlled “hate radio” cannot explain
the geographic variation in the onset of violence, while others have argued that anti-Tutsi
propaganda were critical to driving violence or, at the very least, normalizing it (Fujii 2004;
Yanagizawa-Drott 2014).
Moreover, it is unclear what kinds of content promote violence. Though scholars have
emphasized the primacy of dehumanizing content in genocidal violence (Fein 1979; Charny
et al. 1982), there is little empirical evidence for its efficacy. A major underexplored alter-
native is moral frameworks that justify the righteousness of violence (Viterna 2014). Social
psychologists have long emphasized the significance of morality—conceptions of right and
wrong traits and behaviors—in understanding participation in violence, private and politi-
cal (Bandura, Underwood and Fromson 1975; Baumeister 1999; Beck 1999; Fiske and Rai
2014). Because using violence requires first overcoming formidable moral-emotional reserva-
tions, moral narratives that condone and justify violence can erode these otherwise powerful
restraints on violent behavior (Baumeister 1999; Beck 1999; Fincher and Tetlock 2016).
Moralistic content may also mobilize participation in violent causes by drawing upon in-
dividuals latent moral convictions. Wood (2003) emphasizes the pleasure of agency that
participants derive from acting on their moral convictions in a movement, which Viterna
(2014) extends to the willingness of citizens to accept violence in the name of righteous
causes, movements where “interested publics believe that the enactors of political violence
are defending society’s most vulnerable and protecting a morally legitimate social order.”
Indeed, Kirkpatrick (2008) documents a long history of extrajudicial and vigilante violence
in America that invokes revolutionary values of freedom, justice, and democracy to frame
itself as righteous.
Understanding the effects of highly moralized content on violent behavior requires at-
tention to the emotional responses this content provoke, in particular anger and fear. An
4
abundant literature has analyzed the role of emotion in voter mobilization (Ansolabehere
and Iyengar 1997; Banks 2014; Brader 2005, 2006; Freedman and Goldstein 1999; Huber
et al. 2015; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Mendelberg 2001), and, more recently,
in the context of misinformation (Vosoughi, Roy and Aral 2018); however, the emotional
microfoundations of violent mobilization remain underexplored (Viterna 2013). Anger, or
outrage, appears to be the most relevant mobilizing emotion in the context of violence. Un-
like fear, which tends to demobilize, social psychologists have found that anger and outrage
have mobilizing effects (Banks 2014; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Valentino et al. 2011). Sig-
nificantly, content that conveys or sensationalizes moral violations may lower an individuals
threshold for using violence through provoking moral outrage against violators, which moti-
vates people to shame and punish wrongdoers (Crockett 2017; Goldberg, Lerner and Tetlock
1999). Under some circumstances, however, uncontextualized, or generalized, anger may be
sufficient to mobilize. Banks (2014) argues that non-group specific appeals that stimulate
generalized anger are sufficient to mobilize voters because they trigger latent racist feelings
that, ultimately, are rooted in experiences of anger. These studies, however, test emotions
acontextually and do not consider their possible mediating role. Although research has shown
that messages that provoke anger are more likely to mobilize political participation (Ryan
2012; Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002; Valentino et al. 2011) and moral-emotional
content is more likely to be shared (Brady et al. 2017), it is unclear if such content can
influence violent attitudes or engagement and whether anger, fear—or both—mediate this
relationship.
3 Theory and Hypotheses
We argue that false news content makes individuals more punitive by sensationalizing
transgressive behavior with highly moralized and emotional language. We hypothesize that
the mechanism linking sensationalized content and increased support for violence is outrage—
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i.e. anger that arises from perceived violations of cultural norms of right or wrong behavior
(Crockett 2017; Stets 2012; Turner and Stets 2006). If there is a cue that explicitly links
the norm violator to an outgroup, we predict that individuals will be more likely to sup-
port negative sanctions on that entire outgroup. We expect an interaction between content
type and the outgroup cue: we predict that sensationalized content and the presence of an
outgroup cue will greatly increase support for sanctions on the outgroup. In addition, we
consider that individual support for violence will be partly a function of perceptions of peer
attitudes. Perceived public opinion shapes attitudes and behavior (Neubaum and Kramer
2017; Noelle-Neumann 1993). Public opinion perception may be particularly relevant for
punitiveness, since a perceived audience to one’s decision-making increases an individual’s
willingness to punish moral transgressions (Kurzban, DeScioli and O’Brien 2007) because
proposing punishment of moral transgressors signals to ones peers that one is of high quality
and potentially a good cooperator (Fessler and Haley 2003; Gintis, Smith and Bowles 2001).
The perceived audience consensus on treating a violation may possibly influence individual
attitudes: if one’s peers are uniformly signaling support for punishment, we expect that
an individual will want to conform to the peer consensus to avoid reputational loss. We
do not hypothesize any interaction effects between the peer effects treatment and the other
treatments.
4 Experimental Design and Variable Measurement
Observed correlations between exposure to sensational content and the endorsement of
violence could be due to selection effects, since people prone to violence might be attracted
to such news in the first place. For this reason, we used a survey experiment embedded in
a realistic, fully interactive online news article about a local homicide in the US to examine
how content sensationalization, outgroup cues, and violent comments by other online users
may mobilize or inhibit violent attitudes and online engagement. We chose a homicide story
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for several reasons. Homicide stories have long been a mainstay of national and local news
media in America and a possible source of anti-outgroup bias (Gilliam Jr and Iyengar 2000).
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, there is plentiful anecdotal evidence that misleading crime
stories feature heavily in false news content used to mobilize violence and outrage on social
media. In addition, psychologists have frequently used crime vignettes to test the effects
of perceived violations on punitiveness, though has been done mainly outside of a realistic
news context (Fincher and Tetlock 2016; Tetlock et al. 2007).
To reduce the artificiality of our treatment, we constructed a news site that mimicked the
Associated Press (AP) website and included a functioning comment section (see pp. 1-2 in
the SI for a description of the website).1 The use of the AP template is significant not only
for its perceived objectivity but also because some extremist websites refer to it explicitly as
a desirable format for presenting their own stories (Feinberg 2017). Additionally, the concise
style of AP newswire articles makes the short form of a standard survey experiment vignette
seem more realistic and nonpartisan. We had professional journalists at Politico and the
New York Times vet our vignettes and our constructed website for plausibility and proper
news formatting.
We used a two-by-two-by-two factorial design that randomly assigned individuals to a
combination of three two-level factor treatments, for a total of eight possible combinations.
The treatment vector was a news article that described an alleged homicide, the identity
of the suspect, and retaliatory violence against the suspect by a group of locals in a small
American town (see Figures S2-S5, pp. 4-6). The three treatment factors were: 1) the
description of the homicide, sensationalized (“gruesome slaying of a local child”) or objective
1The interactive survey web app was custom coded using the Python Django web frame-
work and deployed to the web using the Amazon Elastic Beanstalk service. It was designed
to be responsive, working on any screen size or device. Click data, comments, and browser
metadata were stored in a PostgreSQL database hosted on Amazon Relational Database
Services (RDS).
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(“homicide of a local child”); 2) the presence of an outgroup cue, identifying the perpetrator
as a “middle-aged male Muslim refugee” or not (“middle-aged male”); and 3) the content
of the most upvoted comment (violent or conciliatory). Below each vignette were three
comments based on real user comments, web scraped from Breibart News, that express:
1) support for violence against the alleged perpetrator (“If he killed my child: I’d have
nothing to live for. I’d rain fiery retribution down on anyone who killed my child. His end
would be brutal.”); 2) neutral information-seeking about the event (“What could have driven
this man to kill a child?”); and 3) conciliatory (“I hope that this conflict can be resolved
peacefully. My heart goes out to the victims”). Regardless of the treatment condition, the
top comment had 53 likes, the middle comment had eight, and the bottom comment had two.
This distribution of 63 likes follows a power-law distribution that typically characterizes the
distribution of likes on social media. In order to reduce experimenter demand, we included
distractor questions before and after the treatment article that asked respondents about their
online shopping habits.
The pre-treatment survey contained a battery of background questions concerning re-
spondents’ demographic characteristics, party identification, and individual dispositions to-
wards authoritarianism, symbolic racism, and ethnocentrism. We use Feldman and Stenner
(1997)’s four-item Child Rearing Values (CRV) scale to measure authoritarian personality.
Our symbolic racism and ethnocentrism scales are taken directly from ANES. We calculate
ethnocentrism by averaging outgroup feeling thermometers towards Asians, Blacks, Hispan-
ics, Muslims, and refugees. We calculate symbolic racism by averaging the four items from
the ANES symbolic racism scale, reversing two items to make the scale range from low to
high racism.
The post-treatment survey asked a series of questions regarding respondents’ emotional
responses to the homicide and the attack on the alleged perpetrator, separately. Each emo-
tion barometer asks respondents to indicate their felt intensity of eight emotions using five-
point scales. To avoid biasing respondents’ emotional reactions, we included a list of eight
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emotions, positive and negative, based loosely on Robert Plutchik’s typology of basic dis-
crete emotions. We measured violent attitudes directly and indirectly using survey scale and
open-ended responses. To measure punitiveness toward the alleged perpetrator in the story,
we asked respondents to rate their support for nine punishments on seven-point (-3 to 3)
scales. To test for support for extrajudicial violence, we ask if the perpetrator should be
tortured and if he should be jailed without trial. Because direct questions about violence are
subject to social desirability bias, we included indirect measures of punitiveness. We asked
respondents how they think the locals who engaged in street violence against the suspect
should punished for beating the homicide suspect, and we ask if they would be willing to
donate to a legal defense fund for the attackers. To measure attitudes toward outgroups,
we presented respondents with four seven-point (-3 to 3) scales to indicate their support for
or opposition to policies on refugee immigration, Muslim immigration, and monitoring and
registering Muslim communities.
In addition to these survey scale responses, we collected behavioral data on respondents’
interaction with the news website and text data from respondents’ written reactions to
the article. Our survey instructions encouraged respondents both to read the article and
to interact with the website by liking, reporting, or posting comments in the comments
section below the text of the news story, though doing so was not mandatory. Respondents’
comments and any clicks on “report” or “like” buttons were stored in our database as
behavioral measures of support or disapproval of violence. We asked respondents to provide
twenty-word responses to the homicide and the mob attack on the suspect in two separate
open-ended questions. We devised a novel typology to classify violent content (see Figure
S14, p. 23), which a team of four researchers, blind to treatment condition, used to hand
annotate all text data collected in open-ended responses and comments. Agreement between
coders was nearly perfect according to Cohen’s kappa and F1 measures (see Table S15, p.
24).2 After exiting the survey, we debrief respondents to ensure that they understood that
2To measure inter-coder reliability, two coders coded a random sample of open-ended
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the news article we presented was fictitious and why the study required this use of deception.
The IRB reviewed this study and deemed it exempt; the research design, text coding scheme,
and experimental vignettes for this study were pre-registered prior to conducting the study.
Our sample of 1655 respondents, recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in early
December 2018, roughly approximated the demographics of the American population. Within
our sample, 49 percent identified as female and 77 percent as white, in line with the US
Census Bureau’s 2018 population estimates of 51 percent and 77 percent, respectively. The
median age of our respondents was 36, versus 38 in the population. Looking at Gallup’s 2017
estimates of party affiliation, our sample was over-represented in self-identified Democrats
(41.3 percent versus 29 percent) but proportionally representative of Republicans (28 per-
cent). To ensure proportional geographic representativeness, we stratified our sampling
according to the population size of each of the nine regional divisions designated by the
US Census Bureau. This sample includes non-compliers who failed an attention check and
respondents who received the treatment but did not finish the survey. Both noncompliance
and attrition were extremely low: less than 1 percent failed the attention check and 2.54 per-
cent did not complete the entire survey post treatment. Here we conduct an intent-to-treat
analysis and do not exclude subjects on any post-treatment variables. The Supporting In-
formation (pp. 2-4) provides an an in-depth description of the sampling and randomization
process.
responses. Cohen’s kappa is an inter-coder reliability measure for nominal scales and two
coders. Though there is no agreed-upon interpretation of the kappa coefficient, it has been
suggested that 0.61-0.80 indicates substantial agreement, and 0.81-1.0 indicates near-perfect
agreement. F1 is a common performance measure in machine learning ranging from 0 to 1.
It is defined as the harmonic mean of precision and recall. F1 is a good measure of coder
agreement when choices are imbalanced. With imbalance in choices, percent agreement
(accuracy) will overestimate coder agreement.
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5 Results
Sensational content significantly increased support for violence when measured indirectly
through questions about the mob attack on the alleged perpetrator and open-ended responses
on the events in the article.3 Respondents presented with sensational content were more
likely to donate to a legal defense fund for people who engaged in a mob attack on the
alleged perpetrator (P < 0.05), and were more likely to believe that not punishing them
was justified, though this finding is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels
of significance (Figure 1). This effect for sensational content further holds when looking at
the text data from the open-ended responses. We find that sensational content significantly
increased the probability that respondents will express support for violence in their written
responses, including extrajudicial, mob-style violence (P < 0.05); for both measures this
effect represents a roughly fifteen percent increase in probability (Figure 2).4
We used a structural topic model (STM) to systematically summarize the responses of
our subjects to the open ended questions (see Figure S11 and Table S8, p. 14-15). A cursory
comparison of representative responses per topic illustrate differences in punitiveness across
treatment conditions. One respondent given the sensationalized content treatment wrote the
following, which was coded as supportive of violence: “I am absolutely disgusted, appalled,
3With the exception of support for detainment without trial, there are no significant
average treatment effects for sensational content on punitiveness when looking at survey scale
questions that directly asked respondents what kinds of punishments they would support for
the alleged perpetrator in the article (see Figure S7, p. 7). We expected these direct measures
to be vulnerable to social desirability bias.
4The survey scale and text measures of support were highly correlated. Expression of
support for violence in the open-ended responses significantly and positively correlates with
indirect survey scale responses as well as support for the death penalty for the alleged
perpetrator (all P < 0.001) (see Figure S6 and Table S1, pp. 6-7).
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and at a loss for words about this attack. They should kill him in the street. Let everyone
who wants a piece of him have a piece of him.” Contrast this with a non-violent response
in the control condition: “I want to know what happened. I want to know if the person
that was beat up is the one accused of the murder. I want to know the details.” See the
Supporting Information (pp. 17-18) for example open-ended responses and comments by
coding category and treatment condition.
Figure 1: Support for the Mob Attack by Treatment Condition
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Unexpectedly, we find that outgroup cues decreased support for violence against the
perpetrator in the story when measured indirectly and in the open-ended responses (P <
0.05) (Figures 1 and 2). We suspect this negative effect was driven by perceptions that
the event or even the article itself was racist. Respondents were significantly more likely
to believe that the mob attack or the article itself was racially-motivated when given the
outgroup treatment (see Figures S12-13, p. 22).
We find that sensational content and violent peer influence affected how people inter-
act with online content. The sensational content treatment increased the probability that
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Figure 2: Support for Violence in the Open-ended Responses by Treatment Condition
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respondents would leave a comment on the website by roughly sixteen percent (P < 0.05)
(Figure 3). Since the act of leaving a comment is vulnerable to significant selection effects,
we run Heckman two-step selection models to detect and correct for selection bias (Heck-
man 1979). Older respondents and respondents scoring high on symbolic racism were far
more likely to leave a comment. After taking this into account, we find that the sensational
treatment increased the probability of writing a violent comment by roughly twenty-four
percent, though this effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels (P = 0.14
level) (Figure 4).
While peer signals mattered little for attitudinal outcomes, they consistently affected
how respondents interacted with the news article, creating a “cascade effect” (Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch 1992) for endorsement of violence. That is, respondents bandwagoned
onto violent comments if they were already highly-liked. If the top, most-liked comment was
violent, respondents were more likely to like a violent comment (P < 0.05) and to leave a
violent comment of their own (P < 0.05); and far less likely to like a non-violent comment
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(P < 0.001) (Figures 3 and 4). In addition, respondents were less likely to report the
violent comment when it was highly liked, though this effect was not statistically significant
(P = 0.12). Because the most liked comment was also positioned at the top of the three
comments—as is normally the case in a comments section on a news website—this effect may
possibly be driven by the position of the comment rather than the fact that it was highly
liked; that is, respondents may have been merely satisficing by interacting with the upvoted
violent comment because it was at the top of comment list. We believe the violent comment’s
upvoting was more important than its positioning for two reasons. First, we found that the
upvoted violent comment treatment had a negative effect on reporting the violent comment
and a positive treatment effect on expressing violence in a written comment, which suggests
the effect is not due to simply interacting with whatever comment was positioned at the top
of the comments list. Second, each comment was only one or two lines long, so users would
have seen all three comments at once when they scrolled down; it is unlikely that the bottom
two comments would have been less visible to respondents.
Figure 3: Behavioral Outcomes by Treatment Condition
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Figure 4: Comment Outcomes by Treatment Condition
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Sensational content elicited strong emotional responses of anger (P < 0.1), fear (P <
0.05), and anxiety (P < 0.05) from respondents, while outgroup cues and peer support did
not (Figure 5). To gauge whether emotional mechanisms mediated the treatment effect of
sensational content on violent attitudes and behavior, we use causal mediation analysis (Imai,
Jo and Stuart 2011). Because emotion was not randomly assigned, violating the assumption
of sequential ignorability, we include possible confounding covariates to the models–i.e. mea-
sures of authoritarianism (Stenner 2005), ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam 2010), symbolic
racism (Banks 2014), and whether the respondent resided in the American South (Nisbett
1996). Causal mediation analysis revealed that anger, fear, and anxiety mediated the effect
of sensational content on support for the mob attackers’ legal defense fund (ACME = 0.06,
0.04, and 0.03, respectively; all P < 0.05) and the likelihood of expressing support for vio-
lence in the open-ended responses (ACME = 0.007, 0.003, and 0.002, respectively; all P <
0.1) (see Figures S8-10, pp. 13-14). We do not find emotional mediating effects for the other
two treatments or for behavioral and anti-outgroup outcomes.
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Figure 5: Emotional Response by Treatment Condition
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Did this increased punitiveness translate into support for sanctions on Muslims and
refugees? We find sensational content and peer support for violence did not increase support
for anti-Muslim and anti-refugee policies; however, the mere inclusion of an outgroup cue on
average increased support for anti-Muslim and anti-refugee policies (Figure 6). Identifying
the alleged perpetrator as a Muslim refugee caused respondents to support tightening refugee
quotas (P < 0.1) and restricting Muslim immigration (P < 0.05), and positive for support
for increased monitoring of Muslims (P < 0.05) and approval of a Muslim “registry” (P <
0.1). This finding contrasts with the earlier finding that including an outgroup cue increased
individuals’ suspicion that the attack described in the article, or the article itself, was racist.
Indeed, this contradiction appeared in some of the open-ended responses in the outgroup
cue treatment condition. One respondent in the outgroup cue treatment condition wrote: “I
was thinking it was a fake story to invoke Islamophobia...I also do not want them moving
next door to me or in our country, they can keep their backwards traditions in their own
countries.” Perceived racial bias or untrustworthiness of the content’s source did not temper
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respondents’ attitudes towards Muslims and refugees.
Figure 6: Support for Anti-Muslim Policies by Treatment Condition
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This increased punitiveness towards refugees and Muslims may be a function of a general
increase in punitiveness. Outrage arising from morally transgressive behavior may trigger
an “intuitive prosecutor” mindset that heightens one’s desire to punish all subsequent trans-
gressors, regardless of their connection to the original transgressor (Crockett 2017; Goldberg,
Lerner and Tetlock 1999; Tetlock et al. 2007). To this end, we looked at the effects of the
treatments on preferences regarding punishment of homicide, the crime featured in the arti-
cle. We did not find a significant effect between sensational content, outgroup cues, or peer
support on respondents’ attitudes towards the punishment of homicide.
Contrary to our expectations, we did not find a significant interaction effect between
outgroup cues and moral-emotional content on anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim policy pref-
erences, and the effect is not in the expected direction. The average treatment effect for
peer support is insignificant, as is its interaction between outgroup cues, though the signs of
these effects are in their expected direction (see Table S5, p. 11).
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6 Discussion
This study contributes to our understanding of false news and mass opinion in three
ways. First, this is one of the first studies, to our knowledge, to demonstrate the causal
effects of false news consumption on attitudes towards violence and online behavior; in
contrast, the burgeoning literature on misinformation has focused mainly on its patterns of
diffusion. Second, it identifies the importance of both anger and fear as emotional mediators
of the effects of false news consumption on punitiveness. Third, we show that the threshold
by which false news increases anti-outgroup sentiment is rather low: simply attributing a
crime to a member of a certain outgroup is sufficient to increase discriminatory attitudes.
Contrary to research that explicit outgroup cues do not increase support for anti-outgroup
policies (Huber and Lapinski 2006; Mendelberg 2001) or are unnecessary (Banks 2016), we
find that outgroup cues increase punitiveness towards an outgroup even when these cues
raise concerns about racial bias.
Understanding the importance of online content in political life has perhaps never been
more important than in the present. While these findings are a far cry from evidence that
false news mobilizes on-the-ground violence, they underscore the importance of content and
discourse in inflaming violent attitudes and carry significant policy implications for govern-
ments and social media companies working to stem the harmful effects of false news.
While outside the scope of this study, we believe that these findings are not restricted
to the contemporary false news phenomenon or even online content: the use of sensational
content to mobilize violence has a long genealogy. Why leaders choose these strategies for
mobilizing popular support for violence and when they translate into on-the-ground violence
remain crucial and promising areas for future scholarly inquiry.
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1 Sampling Procedures
We recruited our respondents through Amazon Mechanical Turk in early December 2018. We advertised the
Human Intelligence Task (HIT) as a study on media consumption behavior and compensated respondents
2.11 USD for taking our 15-minute survey, which corresponded to the hourly rate of the federal minimum
wage in 2018. After consenting to the take survey, respondents were directed to an external website that
hosted an embedded pre-treatment and post-treatment survey (hosted through Qualtrics) as well as the
AP-styled news website and article.
1.1 Website Design and Randomization
The interactive survey web app was custom coded using the Python Django web framework and deployed
to the web using the Amazon Elastic Beanstalk service. It was designed to be responsive, working on any
screen size or device. Click data, comments, and browser metadata were stored in a PostgreSQL database
hosted on Amazon Relational Database Services (RDS).
In the web app view, we displayed the informed consent script. When respondents consented and con-
tinued to the next view, they were asked to provide their MTurk Worker ID to ensure that they did not fill
out the survey twice. They were then asked to share their location to ensure that they were located within
the United States. After these first two views, respondents were taken to the pre-treatment survey, followed
by the article vignette.
We reverse-engineered the AP website article view for our vignette to maximize its credibility and,
thereby, the external validity of our inferences. When the respondent loaded the article vignette, the web app
randomly assigned them to one of eight possible treatment combinations which were dynamically displayed
in a Django template view. After an interstitial loading page was displayed with a loading bar and a message
reading, ”Loading External Website...,” the article vignette view loaded in an iframe below instructions for
this portion of the survey.
Treatments were randomly assigned through the dynamic web-app which was hosted on Amazon Web
Services (AWS). The web app assigned each respondent a randomly generated 4-character alphanumeric
code. This code was used to match click, comment, and treatment assignment data with the respondent’s
Qualtrics survey responses. We manually checked survey codes for typographical errors to ensure proper
matching.
The comment section was interactive, allowing users to like, report, and comment on the article. The web
app tracked comments, likes, reports, and link clicks using AJAX to communicate between the web client
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and the PostgreSQL database. Each interaction was saved with the respondent’s survey ID to facilitate
matching these data with Qualtrics data.
Figure S1: Loading Interstitial for the Website
15% Complete
Loading External Website...
Instructions
1. Please read the Associated Press article embedded below. Comprehension of the article below will be necessary to complete the next step in the survey.
2. Please read the comments on the article. Either like/report any of the comments you read below or make a comment of your own. Your identity will be kept
anonymous.
3. When you have finished, please click here to continue.
Survey Code: YM6A Read a news article.
1.2 Exclusion Criteria
We drew an initial sample of 1879 respondents, of which we excluded 224 according to the following criteria.
Bots and Fraudulent Accounts. Many accounts on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform are fraudulent
and needed to be screened out of our data. We anticipated this and used four methods to screen them out
of our data. First, we required users to enter a survey completion code on the Amazon Mechanical Turk
platform. This code was displayed to them after completion of the survey. They were also required to provide
their MTurk ID within the survey to ensure that their response could be matched to their MTurk account.
This limited each MTurk ID to one survey response. Second, because many fraudulent users simultaneously
take surveys from multiple MTurk accounts, we collected data on the user’s device (screen size, battery level,
browser, etc.), location, and IP address to identify users who are completing the survey multiple times from
the same machine. Third, to identify automated survey responses from bots, we read every open-ended
response and excluded obvious machine-generated text or text scraped from the internet using reference
words from the open-ended questions. Finally, we asked a very simple attention check question at the end of
the survey. After reviewing failed attention checks, most were from accounts that appeared to be automated.
Those who failed the attention check but did not appear to be bots were kept in the sample.
Duplicates. Many subjects took the survey several times due to an error in our screening procedure that
was fixed early on. For these subjects we dropped all but the first response from our sample using their
MTurk ID, as described above.
Extreme Non-compliers. Respondents who finished the survey in under 7 minutes were excluded, since
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it was not within reasonable expectations that they could have completed the survey within that amount of
time.
Non-US Residents. Since our relevant population was US residents, we required respondents to reside
in the United States. However, because MTurk’s screening criteria is not perfect, several respondents who
were from outside the United States took the survey. We screened these respondents by using geolocation
and IP address filters and identifying non-English open-ended responses.
2 Survey Experiment Vignettes
2.1 Article Vignettes
Figure S2: Vignette with Objective Content and Unspecified Perpetrator
Homicide of Local Child in Glendale, OH
Several Locals Attack Alleged Perpetrator Before He is Taken into Custody
By LEE STRANAHAN
GLENDALE, OH — Reports of a homicide of a local child shook residents of an Ohio town. Several locals tracked down the
alleged perpetrator and beat him in the street, leaving him severely injured. The alleged perpetrator was taken into
custody shortly after and transported to an area hospital.
A graphic video circulating on social media  shows the suspect being beaten by local residents. Investigators did not
disclose the identity of the alleged perpetrator, but confirmed he is a middle-aged male who had been living in the
community for about one year. The identity of the victim has not been released.
Glendale Police confirmed that three of the local residents involved in the assault of the alleged perpetrator have been
taken into custody.
ASSOCIATED PRESS
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Figure S3: Vignette with Moral-Emotional Content and Muslim Refugee Perpetrator
Gruesome Slaying of Local Child in Glendale, OH
Several Locals Attack Alleged Perpetrator Before He is Taken into Custody
By LEE STRANAHAN
GLENDALE, OH — Reports of a gruesome slaying of a local child shook residents of an Ohio town. Several locals tracked
down the alleged perpetrator and beat him in the street, leaving him severely injured. The alleged perpetrator was taken
into custody shortly after and transported to an area hospital.
A graphic video circulating on social media  shows the suspect being beaten by local residents. Investigators did not
disclose the identity of the alleged perpetrator, but confirmed he is a middle-aged male muslim refugee who had been
living in the community for about one year. The identity of the victim has not been released.
Glendale Police confirmed that three of the local residents involved in the assault of the alleged perpetrator have been
taken into custody.
ASSOCIATED PRESS
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Figure S4: Comment List with Most Upvoted Violent Comment
3 COMMENTS
Login disabled. Comments will be posted anonymously.
Share your thoughts...
Post
Donut227  48 minutes ago
If he killed my child: I'd have nothing to live for. I'd rain fiery retribution on anyone that killed my child. His
end would be brutal.
Like (53) Report
FilmFanatic6  43 minutes ago
What could have driven this man to kill a child?
Like (8) Report
Stargazer14  41 minutes ago
I hope that this tragedy can be resolved peacefully. My heart goes out to the victims.
Like (2) Report
Figure S5: Comment List with Most Upvoted Conciliatory Comment
3 COMMENTS
Login disabled. Comments will be posted anonymously.
Share your thoughts...
Post
Stargazer14  41 minutes ago
I hope that this tragedy can be resolved peacefully. My heart goes out to the victims.
Like (53) Report
FilmFanatic6  43 minutes ago
What could have driven this man to kill a child?
Like (8) Report
Donut227  48 minutes ago
If he killed my child: I'd have nothing to live for. I'd rain fiery retribution on anyone that killed my child. His
end would be brutal.
Like (2) Report
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3 Measurement Validity Checks
Figure S6: Correlation of Measures of Support for Violence
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Table S1: Willingness to Donate to Legal Defense Fund for Mob Attackers and Expressed Support for
Extrajudicial Violence in Open-ended Responses
Dependent variable:
Extrajudicial
Legal Defense Fund 0.118∗∗∗
(0.005)
Observations 1,602
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4 Attitudes Towards Violence
Figure S7: Support for Judicial and Extrajudicial Punishment by Treatment Condition (Direct Measures)
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4.1 Judicial Violence (Direct)
Table S2: Attitudes Toward Judicial Punishment of the Alleged Perpetrator
Dependent variable:
Lenient Lenient Prison Prison Lethal Lethal Extreme Lethal Extreme Lethal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sensational 0.060 0.058 0.015 0.006 −0.019 0.019 0.044 0.099
(0.053) (0.053) (0.045) (0.045) (0.107) (0.099) (0.111) (0.102)
Outgroup −0.009 0.233 0.034 0.092 −0.150 −0.222 −0.272∗∗ −0.487
(0.053) (0.179) (0.045) (0.161) (0.107) (0.378) (0.111) (0.370)
Peer Violence −0.035 −0.039 −0.015 −0.013 0.006 0.019 0.044 0.044
(0.053) (0.053) (0.045) (0.045) (0.107) (0.098) (0.111) (0.102)
Auth. (Log) −0.043 −0.076 0.513∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.053) (0.122) (0.127)
Ethno. (Log) 0.003 −0.003 0.007 0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Symb. Racism (Log) −0.045 −0.117 1.053∗∗∗ 1.143∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.094) (0.218) (0.228)
South 0.088 −0.017 0.110 0.220∗∗
(0.056) (0.046) (0.102) (0.107)
Republican −0.192∗∗∗ −0.077 0.675∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.059) (0.111) (0.131)
Outgroup x Auth. (Log) −0.003 0.125 0.025 −0.079
(0.086) (0.077) (0.171) (0.177)
Outgroup x Ethno (Log) 0.002 0.001 −0.006 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Outgroup x Symb. Racism (Log) −0.238 −0.147 0.175 0.133
(0.153) (0.140) (0.302) (0.315)
Observations 1,629 1,629 1,629 1,629
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.2 Extrajudicial Violence (Direct)
Table S3: Direct Questions About Extrajudicial Punishment of the Alleged Perpetrator
Dependent variable:
Torture Torture Detainment Detainment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sensational 0.057 0.083 0.204∗ 0.224∗∗
(0.104) (0.097) (0.108) (0.104)
Outgroup −0.077 0.031 0.014 −0.314
(0.104) (0.331) (0.108) (0.357)
Peer Violence −0.024 −0.018 −0.055 −0.041
(0.104) (0.097) (0.108) (0.104)
Auth. (Log) 0.659∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.127)
Ethno. (Log) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Symb. Racism (Log) 0.833∗∗∗ 0.381
(0.225) (0.232)
South 0.268∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗
(0.101) (0.108)
Republican 0.100 0.241∗
(0.130) (0.137)
Outgroup x Auth. (Log) 0.127 0.043
(0.170) (0.180)
Outgroup x Ethno (Log) −0.0001 0.005
(0.005) (0.006)
Outgroup x Symb. Racism (Log) −0.169 0.093
(0.307) (0.321)
Observations 1,629 1,629
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.3 Extrajudicial Violence (Indirect)
Table S4: Indirect Questions About Extrajudicial Punishment of the Alleged Perpetrator
Dependent variable:
No Punish. No Punish. Comm. Service Comm. Service Leg. Defense Leg. Defense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sensational 0.164 0.203∗ 0.052 0.054 0.217∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.108) (0.104) (0.104) (0.099) (0.096)
Outgroup −0.285∗∗ −1.005∗∗∗ −0.205∗∗ 0.067 −0.083 −0.842∗∗
(0.111) (0.378) (0.104) (0.379) (0.099) (0.337)
Peer Violence 0.152 0.145 0.168 0.166 0.024 0.027
(0.111) (0.107) (0.104) (0.104) (0.099) (0.095)
Auth. (Log) 0.314∗∗ −0.188 0.434∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.134) (0.126)
Ethno. (Log) 0.011∗∗ −0.003 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Symb. Racism (Log) 0.349 0.034 0.280
(0.247) (0.239) (0.221)
South 0.204∗ −0.040 0.234∗∗
(0.112) (0.109) (0.099)
Republican 0.472∗∗∗ 0.224∗ 0.372∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.132) (0.123)
Outgroup x Auth. (Log) −0.079 −0.253 0.042
(0.188) (0.185) (0.169)
Outgroup x Ethno (Log) 0.003 −0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Outgroup x Symb. Racism (Log) 0.535 −0.003 0.495∗
(0.339) (0.335) (0.301)
Observations 1,615 1,615 1,615
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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5 Attitudes Towards Outgroups
Table S5: OLS Models for Attitudes Toward Outgroups
Dependent variable:
Refugees Refugees Muslim Immigration Muslim Immigration Monitoring Monitoring Registry Registry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sensational 0.173∗ 0.103 0.066 0.004 −0.077 −0.032 −0.008 0.035
(0.094) (0.069) (0.086) (0.067) (0.086) (0.073) (0.103) (0.084)
Outgroup −0.148 −0.444∗ −0.200∗∗ −0.577∗∗ 0.181∗∗ 0.065 0.193∗ 0.328
(0.094) (0.238) (0.086) (0.229) (0.086) (0.257) (0.103) (0.269)
Peer Violence −0.005 0.0003 0.009 0.021 0.090 0.084 0.091 0.098
(0.094) (0.069) (0.086) (0.066) (0.086) (0.072) (0.103) (0.083)
Auth. (Log) −0.408∗∗∗ −0.377∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.082) (0.090) (0.107)
Ethno. (Log) −0.016∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Symb. Racism (Log) −2.051∗∗∗ −1.791∗∗∗ 1.289∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.159) (0.173) (0.193)
South −0.135∗ −0.155∗∗ 0.122 0.292∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.069) (0.076) (0.089)
Republican −1.089∗∗∗ −0.792∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.085) (0.094) (0.116)
Outgroup x Auth. (Log) −0.011 0.063 0.161 0.250∗
(0.123) (0.114) (0.126) (0.151)
Outgroup x Ethno (Log) −0.001 −0.004 0.002 −0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Outgroup x Symb. Racism (Log) 0.314 0.408∗ −0.081 −0.249
(0.226) (0.212) (0.238) (0.271)
Observations 1,613 1,612 1,612 1,612
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
6 Behavioral Indicators
Table S6: OLS Models for Behavioral Indicators
Dependent variable:
Liked Viol. Liked Viol. Liked Non-viol. Liked Non-viol. Reported Viol. Reported Viol. Wrote Comment Wrote Comment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sensational 0.004 0.011 −0.025 −0.028 −0.018 −0.016 0.045∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Outgroup −0.014 −0.044 −0.013 0.054 0.034 0.068 −0.006 −0.085
(0.025) (0.084) (0.021) (0.072) (0.024) (0.082) (0.023) (0.080)
Peer Violence 0.049∗∗ 0.050∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.034 −0.035 0.027 0.026
(0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Auth. (Log) 0.042 −0.015 −0.022 −0.002
(0.029) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028)
Ethno. (Log) −0.00002 −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Symb. Racism (Log) 0.213∗∗∗ −0.012 0.100∗ 0.059
(0.051) (0.043) (0.051) (0.049)
South 0.021 −0.013 −0.014 0.007
(0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
Republican 0.039 −0.082∗∗∗ −0.026 0.006
(0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029)
Outgroup x Auth. (Log) 0.079∗ 0.001 0.038 −0.005
(0.041) (0.036) (0.040) (0.038)
Outgroup x Ethno (Log) −0.0003 −0.001 −0.0002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Outgroup x Symb. Racism (Log) −0.014 −0.031 −0.045 0.027
(0.071) (0.063) (0.072) (0.068)
Observations 1,652 1,652 1,652 1,652
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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7 Emotional Mediators
Table S7: Emotional Responses by Treatment Condition
Dependent variable:
Anger Anger Disgust Disgust Fear Fear Anxiety Anxiety
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sensational 0.121∗ 0.121∗ 0.078 0.083 0.126∗∗ 0.115∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.134∗∗
(0.063) (0.062) (0.059) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Outgroup −0.061 −0.155 −0.071 −0.346 0.081 0.016 0.019 −0.145
(0.063) (0.222) (0.059) (0.211) (0.062) (0.232) (0.062) (0.234)
Peer Violence 0.037 0.051 −0.038 −0.029 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.013
(0.063) (0.062) (0.059) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Auth. (Log) 0.311∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗
(0.074) (0.071) (0.075) (0.075)
Ethno. (Log) −0.009∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Symb. Racism (Log) −0.078 0.007 −0.165 −0.149
(0.136) (0.132) (0.138) (0.136)
South 0.095 0.069 −0.058 0.003
(0.064) (0.061) (0.065) (0.065)
Republican 0.278∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.074 0.063
(0.076) (0.072) (0.080) (0.079)
Outgroup x Auth. (Log) −0.102 0.037 0.0003 −0.061
(0.105) (0.099) (0.107) (0.107)
Outgroup x Ethno (Log) 0.009∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.004 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Outgroup x Symb. Racism (Log) −0.114 −0.027 −0.063 0.001
(0.192) (0.180) (0.191) (0.194)
Observations 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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8 Causal Mediation Analysis
Figure S8: Causal Mediation Analysis for Anger
Anger
Sensational Legal Fund
b = 0.128, p = 0.041 b = 0.471, p = 0
Direct effect, b = 0.195, p = 0.04
Indirect effect, b = 0.055, 95% CI [-0.004, 0.116]
Anger
Sensational Extrajudicial
b = 0.116, p = 0.065 b = 0.07, p = 0
Direct effect, b = 0.049, p = 0
Indirect effect, b = 0.008, 95% CI [0, 0.019]
Figure S9: Causal Mediation Analysis for Anxiety
Anxiety
Sensational Legal Fund
b = 0.131, p = 0.037 b = 0.281, p = 0
Direct effect, b = 0.207, p = 0.04
Indirect effect, b = 0.037, 95% CI [0.007, 0.074]
Anxiety
Sensational Extrajudicial
b = 0.128, p = 0.041 b = 0.018, p = 0.054
Direct effect, b = 0.06, p = 0.04
Indirect effect, b = 0.002, 95% CI [0, 0.006]
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Figure S10: Causal Mediation Analysis for Fear
Fear
Sensational Legal Fund
b = 0.121, p = 0.054 b = 0.316, p = 0
Direct effect, b = 0.223, p = 0
Indirect effect, b = 0.035, 95% CI [0.003, 0.078]
Fear
Sensational Extrajudicial
b = 0.122, p = 0.052 b = 0.015, p = 0.111
Direct effect, b = 0.057, p = 0
Indirect effect, b = 0.002, 95% CI [0, 0.005]
9 Open-Ended Responses
9.1 Structural Topic Model of Open-Ended Responses
Figure S11: Topic Probabilities
kill, felt, life, family, anger, harm, local, glad
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Table S8: Most Representative Responses by Topic
Topic Text Peer Sens. Out.
Topic 1 The loss of a child, especially by violence, is unthinkable. I understand the frustration
of the locals but vigilante justice is equally unthinkable. taking the law into one’s own
hands is despicable. Vigilante justice is never warranted and is horrible. It is outlawed
for a reason.
Yes No No
Topic 2 Child murderers are some of the worst scum this world can produce. Murderes of any
kind are terrible but people that prey on the weakest and most vulnerable aspects
of our society are at the bottom of the sludge pit. This man needs to be tried and
convicted. A frothing mob cannot be expected to make rational choices and lynching
someone in the street is garbage we used to do hundreds of years ago and garbage that
third world hellholes continue to do today. I understand being enraged but let the
police do their work.
No No No
Topic 3 the man got what he deserved. he should get more than that though. anyone who
hurts a child should get the strictest punishment he got what he deserved. no one
should hurt an innocent defenseless child
Yes No Yes
Topic 4 I felt anger and fear. I felt extreme sadness for the victim and the victim’s family. I feel
confusion about something like this could happen. I felt the attack of the perpetrator
were justified. It was only a small step of vindication that the victim and the victim’s
family deserve.
No Yes Yes
Topic 5 As noted in my comment regarding the article provided, there is far too little detail to
draw any conclusions regarding the incident other than it is profoundly horrific and sad.
I have many questions to be answered to even begin to form a cohesive assessment of
this tragedy. Again, there is not enough information to draw an intelligent conclusion.
One can only presume that the emotional reaction of the bystanders was reactionary
and vengeful due to the immediacy of the event.
Yes Yes No
Topic 6 I feel like people should not be driven to these extremes. It is a little ridiculous that
humans act like this. I hope everyone begins to chill more I feel like he is someone to
be punished but if you are to do the same thing as he doing you are no better. To
become what others are negatively will ultimately be the same fate.
No No Yes
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9.2 Open-Ended Outcomes by Treatment Group
Table S9: OLS Model for Expressed Support for Violence, Extrajudicial Violence, and Lethal Violence in
Open-ended Responses
Dependent variable:
Violence Violence Extrajudicial Violence Extrajudicial Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sensational 0.057∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.057∗∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Outgroup −0.075∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.148∗
(0.025) (0.084) (0.024) (0.080)
Peer Violence −0.036 −0.035 −0.009 −0.009
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Auth. (Log) 0.048 0.038
(0.029) (0.030)
Ethno. (Log) 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Symb. Racism (Log) 0.053 0.061
(0.052) (0.053)
South 0.051∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.025) (0.025)
Republican 0.073∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.031)
Outgroup x Auth. (Log) 0.015 0.047
(0.041) (0.041)
Outgroup x Ethno (Log) −0.001 −0.0005
(0.001) (0.001)
Outgroup x Symb. Racism (Log) 0.110 0.050
(0.072) (0.071)
Observations 1,613 1,613
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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9.3 Example Open-ended Responses by Condition
1. Extrajudicial Violence and Lethal Violence (Outgroup Baseline, Sensational Treatment,
Peer-Violence Treatment): “I am absolutely disgusted, appalled, and at a loss for words about this
attack. They should kill him in the street. Let everyone who wants a piece of him have a piece of
him.”
2. Lethal Violence (Outgroup Treatment, Sensational Treatment, Peer-Violence Baseline):
“I think the perpetrator got what he deserved. It is a shame that they didn’t kill him the same way
he killed the child. The attackers shouldn’t be punished for attacking the perpetrator.”
3. Judicial Violence (Outgroup Treatment, Sensational Treatment, Peer-Violence Baseline):
“Horrible that anyone would want to harm or kill a child. Worst of the worst in society. They should
be punished to the fullest extent by the laws.”
4. Information-Seeking (Outgroup Treatment, Sensational Baseline, Peer Violence Base-
line): “I want to know what happened. I want to know if the person that was beat up is the one
accused of the murder. I want to know the details”
5. Information-Seeking (Outgroup Baseline, Sensational Baseline, Peer-Violence Treatment):
“I wanted to know more behind it. My reaction was what happened. The article only stated that a
homicide had occurred to a child and that the victim’s identity as well as the perpetrator’s identity
hadn’t been released, but there were not circumstances stated around the incident.”
6. Cognitive Dissonance (Outgroup Treatment, Sensational Treatment, Peer-Violence Treat-
ment): “It’s weird because just not knowing the details, just gut reaction I feel good that the mofo got
what he deserved but then I start thinking more and I really don’t know any details and the alleged
perpetrator has not been convicted. I’m conflicted”
7. Racism (Outgroup Treatment, Sensational Control, Peer-Violence Treatment): “I wonder
if, because he was Muslim, he was unjustly targeted. There didn’t seem to be any proof yet of who
was responsible. I never agree with using violence to address a violent act.”
8. Cognitive Dissonance and Racism (Outgroup Treatment, Sensational Treatment, Peer-
Violence Treatment): “I was originally thinking ”good for them”. Then I thought ”what if that
dude didn’t do it and they angry mob just beat up a muslim. Then I felt remorse for the whole
situation. ”
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9. Surprise at Lack of Emotion in Article (Outgroup Treatment, Sensational Baseline, Peer-
Violence Baseline): “That’s one of the most unemotionally written articles I’ve came across in quiet
a while. Most articles are written in a way to elicit feelings of emotion from it’s audience. The behavior
of the accused is deplorable but the author didn’t present it that way. It seemed to be more focused
on the attack against the accused.”
9.4 Example Comments by Condition
1. Judicial Violence (Outgroup Treatment, Sensational Baseline, Peer-Violence Treatment):
“This middle-aged male Muslim refugee who had been living in the community for about one year
should be sent back to where he came from and let them deal with him. This person is not going to
last very long in prison.”
2. Judicial and Lethal Violence (Outgroup Baseline, Sensational Baseline, Peer-Violence
Treatment): “I think this person should get death penalty for killing a child.”
3. Lethal Violence (Outgroup Baseline, Sensational Treatment, Peer-Violence Baseline):
“They should have killed him right then and there. Hopefully they put him in general population
and do not waste tax money protecting him from other inmates.”
4. Racism (Outgroup Treatment, Sensational Treatment, Peer-Violence Treatment): “This is
clearly a hate crime. There’s no mention of evidence, since of course they didn’t need any to savagely
beat a Muslim refugee. This is just more right-wing paranoia, racism, and violence.”
5. Concerns with Vigilantism (Outgroup Baseline, Sensational Baseline, Peer-Violence Treat-
ment) “We should be wary about rushing to judgment. The murder of a child is a most heinous crime,
but unless someone actually witnessed it happen or has incontrovertible proof it is possible that the
suspect is actually innocent. If that is the case then it would turn out that the local residents beat up
an innocent man, while the real murderer is out there.”
6. Demonizing (Outgroup Baseline, Sensational Treatment, Peer-Violence Treatment) “What
is wrong with him? Who can be so cruel!”
7. Dehumanizing and Extrajudicial Violence (Outgroup Baseline, Sensational Baseline, Peer-
Violence Treatment) “Vigilante justice is the best kind of justice for monsters like this perpetrator!”
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10 Comments
10.1 Comment Text Models
Table S10: OLS Model for Propensity to Post a Comment
Dependent variable:
Posted a Comment Posted a Comment
(1) (2)
Sensational 0.045∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Outgroup −0.006 −0.085
(0.023) (0.080)
Peer Violence 0.027 0.026
(0.023) (0.023)
Auth. (Log) −0.002
(0.028)
Ethno. (Log) −0.001
(0.001)
Symb. Racism (Log) 0.059
(0.049)
South 0.007
(0.024)
Republican 0.006
(0.029)
Outgroup x Auth. (Log) −0.005
(0.038)
Outgroup x Ethno (Log) 0.001
(0.001)
Outgroup x Symb. Racism (Log) 0.027
(0.068)
Observations 1,652
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table S11: Logit Model for Propensity to Post a Comment
Dependent variable:
Posted a Comment
Gender 0.122
(0.108)
Age 0.009∗
(0.005)
Education 0.042
(0.041)
Authoritarian (Log) 0.014
(0.094)
Ethnocentrism (Log) −0.001
(0.003)
Symbolic Racism (Log) 0.299∗
(0.175)
South 0.022
(0.111)
Republican −0.002
(0.135)
Observations 1,655
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table S12: Heckman 2-Step Selection Model OLS Model for Expressed Support for Violence, Extrajudicial
Violence, and Lethal Violence in Comments
Dependent variable:
Violence
Sensational 0.047
(0.037)
Outgroup −0.063∗
(0.036)
Peer Violence 0.082∗∗
(0.037)
Observations 1,650
ρ −0.011
Inverse Mills Ratio −0.004 (0.238)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table S13: Additional Text Responses (Comments)
Dependent variable:
Cognitive Dissonance Cognitive Dissonance Info. Seeking Info. Seeking Fake News Fake News Racism Racism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sensational 0.022 0.022 −0.042 −0.044∗ −0.009 −0.009 −0.006 −0.012
(0.019) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.015)
Outgroup −0.007 −0.005 0.009 −0.050 −0.007 −0.008 0.056∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.072) (0.026) (0.096) (0.006) (0.026) (0.016) (0.066)
Peer Violence 0.032∗ 0.033∗ −0.034 −0.034 0.007 0.007 −0.023 −0.019
(0.019) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.006) (0.005) (0.016) (0.015)
Auth. (Log) −0.011 −0.028 0.005 0.011
(0.026) (0.028) (0.004) (0.010)
Ethno. (Log) 0.0004 0.001 0.0003 −0.0001
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0001)
Symb. Racism (Log) −0.008 −0.086 −0.019 0.018
(0.032) (0.057) (0.014) (0.014)
South 0.031 −0.055∗∗ −0.005 −0.002
(0.021) (0.025) (0.004) (0.016)
Republican −0.006 0.035 0.007 −0.021
(0.024) (0.032) (0.007) (0.016)
Outgroup x Auth. (Log) 0.006 0.038 −0.005 −0.018
(0.034) (0.043) (0.004) (0.024)
Outgroup x Ethno (Log) −0.001 0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Outgroup x Symb. Racism (Log) 0.020 0.024 0.013 −0.103∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.077) (0.010) (0.039)
Observations 498 498 498 498
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table S14: Additional Text Responses (Open Ended)
Dependent variable:
Cognitive Dissonance Cognitive Dissonance Info. Seeking Info. Seeking Fake News Fake News Racism Racism Social Desirability Social Desirability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sensational 0.046∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.006 −0.007 −0.010 −0.001 −0.001
(0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Outgroup −0.036∗ −0.066 0.020 0.011 −0.003 −0.032∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.028
(0.019) (0.069) (0.015) (0.055) (0.006) (0.016) (0.011) (0.044) (0.006) (0.018)
Peer Violence 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 −0.025∗∗ −0.025∗∗ −0.003 −0.002
(0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Auth. (Log) −0.047∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗ −0.004 −0.001
(0.024) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001)
Ethno. (Log) 0.001 0.001∗ 0.0004∗ −0.0002 0.00001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.00001)
Symb. Racism (Log) −0.037 −0.057∗ −0.009 −0.017 −0.002
(0.043) (0.031) (0.010) (0.016) (0.004)
South 0.007 −0.028∗ −0.004 −0.020∗ 0.002
(0.020) (0.015) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006)
Republican −0.0004 0.004 −0.001 0.002 0.005
(0.024) (0.018) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009)
Outgroup x Auth. (Log) 0.042 0.022 0.016∗ −0.046∗∗ 0.011
(0.032) (0.025) (0.008) (0.019) (0.011)
Outgroup x Ethno (Log) −0.001 −0.001 −0.0003 0.0002 −0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003)
Outgroup x Symb. Racism (Log) 0.016 0.032 0.022 −0.052 −0.001
(0.056) (0.045) (0.015) (0.034) (0.015)
Observations 1,623 1,623 1,623 1,623 1,623
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure S12: Additional Comment Outcomes by Treatment Condition
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Figure S13: Additional Open-Ended Outcomes by Treatment Condition
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10.2 Coding Diagrams
Figure S14: Violence Coding Diagram
Does the text mention or imply 
support for or a desire to use 
violence against an individual 
and/or group of people? Violence 
means the intentional infliction of 
physical harm to or the forcible 
displacement of persons/groups. 
Is the violence represented in 
the text credible? For 
example, “I will kill you” 
(credible) vs. “If you show up 
late I’m going to kill you” (not 
credible)
Does the text mention or imply 
extrajudicial means of 
violence—e.g. torture, mob 
violence/lynching, etc.—against 
persons/groups?  
Does the content mention or 
imply lethal violence—i.e. 
violence that will most likely 
result in death of person(s) 
and/or group(s)?
Figure S15: Racism and Social Desirability Coding Diagrams
Does the author express 
concerns that violence is 
motivated by racism, 
islamophobia, or any other form 
of prejudice? (E.g “this sounds 
like a lynching,” “I worry he was 
targeted because he is different”)
NO
YES
YES RACISM
NO
YES
YES
SOCIAL
DESIRABILITY
Does the author express that their 
opinions are not motivated by 
racism, islamophobia, or any other 
form of prejudice? (E.g “regard-
less of his race/religion,” “I’m not 
racist, but...”)
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Figure S16: Information-Seeking and Fake News Coding Diagrams
Does the author express a desire 
to learn more about a particular 
aspect of the news story?
NO
YES
YES
INFORMATION
SEEKING
Does the author express doubts 
about the veracity of the news 
story or certain parts of the news 
story?
NO
YES
YES FAKE NEWS
Figure S17: Cognitive Dissonance Coding Diagrams
Does the author express 
approval for violence? (NOTE: 
expressing understanding of 
emotions of those engaging in 
violence does not count as 
approval)
NO
YES
YES
COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE
Does the author also express 
disapproval for violence? (E.g. 
“leave it to the courts”, “I would 
have preferred they called the 
police,” etc.) 
NO
11 Intercoder Reliability
Table S15: Intercoder Reliability Measures
Category Kappa F1
Cognitive Dissonance 0.80 0.96
Fake News 1.00 1.00
Info. Seeking 0.71 0.93
Racism/Hate 0.78 0.97
Social Desirability 0.74 0.99
Violence 0.81 0.90
Lethal Violence 0.98 1.00
Extrajudicial Violence 0.89 0.95
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